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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

}

Plaintiff and Respondent, (
vs.
NORBE'f NELSON aka CARL
DOUGLAS,
Defendant.

Case
No.

1793

APPELLANT-BONDSMEN'S BRIEF
STATEl\iENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a matter wherein the Bondsmen, Dewey
L. Sanone and Samuel Sanone, attempt to set a Bail
Forfeiture aside.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On November 28, 1966, upon motion of Boyd
Hunnell, District Attorney in and for the Seventh
J u<licial District, the Honorable Henry Ruggeri entered an Order Forfeiting Bail. On January 11, 1967,
the Bondsmen's Motion to set Forfeiture Aside was
1

filed and the same was argued and denied February 7,
1967, by the Honorable F. ,V. Keller. A Notice of
Appeal was filed by the Bondsmen February 15, 1967,
and said appeal was voluntarily dismissed by the Bondsmen March 30, 1967. The matter was remitted by the
Supreme Court to the District Court on April 5, 1967.
Judgment was entered against Dewey L. Sanone and
Samuel Sanone on May 2, 1967, and this Appeal is
taken from that Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant-Bondsmen seek a decision from
this Court overruling the Order denying the setting
aside of the Bail Forfeiture and vacating the J udgment or that failing a modificaton of the Judgment
to the extent that the ultimate liability on the J udgment be held in abeyance until the State of Tennessee
releases the principal with the requirement that the
Bondsmen indemnify the State of Utah in the return
of the principal to Utah to stand trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The principal, Carl Douglas, also known as N orbet
Nelson, appeared before the Honorable Edward Sheya,
Judge of the City Court of Price, Carbon County,
on the 13th day of October, 1966, for arraignment on
a complaint filed in said court wherein the defendant
was charged with the commission of the crime of Grand
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:

Larceny. At said arraignment, the Judge of said court
fixed bail in the sum of $1,000.00 whether cash or
surety bond and ordered the principal remanded to the
Carbon County Sheriff until bail was posted or until
the principal was otherwise discharged.
On October 25, 1966, the Appellant, Dewey L.
Sanone and Samuel Sanone, posted a surety bond in
the sum of $1,000.00. Said bond was approved by the
Court and the principal released from the custody of
the Sheriff.
A Preliminary Hearing was conducted on October
27, 1966, and the principal bound over to answer to the
crime of attempted Grand Larceny. Thereafter the principal failed to appear for arraignment in the District
Court and the Honorable Henry Ruggeri on the 28th
day of November, 1966, entered an order forfeiting bail.
Appellant moved the Court to set this forfeiture aside
and the same was argued and denied February 7, 1967.
Judgment was entered against the Appellants herein
on May 2, 1967, from which this Appeal was taken.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET
TUE FORFEITURE ASIDE AS THE BONDS1\fEN'S OBLIGATION IS EXCUSABLE UPON
ADEQUATE REASON.
3

A prisoner released on Bail is regarded as being
transferred from the custody of the public officials
charged with his confinement to that of the sureties
on his bail bond or recognizance. The sureties (appellant herein) are then charged with the duty of producing him to answer the charges against him at the proper
time and are liable for a failure to do so, unless the
failure is excused for reasons which the courts regard
as adequate. 'Vhat reasons are so regarded have varied
from time to time and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
but in general it has been said that a default in appear.
ance will be excused only by an act of God, an act of
the law, an act of the obligee, or an act of the public
enemy. American Jurisprudence 2nd, Y olume 8, Sec- '
tions 177-184, Bail and Recognizance.
1

It should be noted that the legislators saw fit to
employ the general principles pre\iously enunciated
and did so in promulgating, Title 77, Chapter 43,
Section 25,

FORFEITCRE OF BAIL BY
NONAPPEARAXCE-EXCCSE
"If, without sufficient excuse, the defendant ,
neglects to appear for arraignment or for trial
or judgment, or upon any other occasion where
his presence in court is lawfully required, or to
surrender himself in execution of the judgment,
the Court must direct the fact to be entered upon '
its minutes. and the undertaking of bail, or the
monev deposited instead of bail as the case may
be, shall thereupon be declared forfeited. but
if at any time before the final judgment of the
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Court the defendant or his bail appears and satisfactorily excuses his neglect, the Court may
direct the forfeiture of the undertaking of th.e
deposit to be discharged upon such terms as may
be just."
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington
has examined a similar fact situation in State vs. Reed,
127 \Vash. 166, 219 P 833 ( 1923), and that Court
concluded that an order requiring the Bondsmen to
repay the State's costs incurred was appropriate and
affirmed the lower court's order staying action against
the Bondsmen until a reasonable time after the prisoner
is released from custody of the other State.
Patricia Reed was charged with a felony in Washington, admitted to bail, and the Bail Bond executed
and filed. The case was called for trial and the defendant failed to appear. 'Vhereupon the sureties located
her in California serving an indeterminate sentence in
the Pentientiary of California.
The sureties in the Reed case contended that Court
is vested with discretion to set aside a forfeiture and
stay further proceedings until the principal can be
produced. The Utah code section previously cited
appears to vest the identical discretion with the Utah
trial courts. The Court refers to the rationale behind
the granting of bail in Washington by relying upon
State vs. Johnson, 69 Wash. 612, 126 56, (1912),
and State vs. Jakshitz, 76 Wash. 253, 136 P 132
(1913).

Appellant contends that the underlying thesis m
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the Washington cases are inherent in a liberal reading
of the Utah Code section. This policy was adhered to
in State vs. J akshitz, supra, and it was added that:
"The 'giving of bail' should be encouraged
for various reasons: That the State may be relieved of the burden of keeping an accused
person; that the innocent shall not be confined
pending a trial and formal acquittal; that in cases
of flight, a recapture may be aided by the bondsmen who, it is presumed, will be moved by an
incentive to prevent judgment, or if it has been
entered, to absolve it and to mitigate its penalties.
To accomplish these things and others, courts
have been liberal in vacating judgments entered
on Bail Bonds, exercising always a broad discretion and in proper cases preserving the equities of the public by deducting such costs and
expenses as may have been incurred by the State.
To hold otherwise, would discourage the giving
of bail and defeat the manifest purpose of the
Statute."
The Colorado Supreme Court has addressed itself
to this problem in J. R. Allison, et al vs. The People '
of the State of Colorado, 286 P2d 1102 (1955). In the 1
Allison case, the defendant was admitted to bail on
bond and, while at liberty pending trial was convicted
of a felony in foreign jurisdiction aind confined to
prison in that state so that he coud not appear for trial
pursuant to the condition of the bail bond. The Colo·
rado Court relieved the surety from forfeiture of bail '
bond upon offer to defray costs and expenses involved
in returning defendant upon completion of imprison·
ment.
6

The Allison case supports its holding by reference
to People vs. Pollock, 65 Colo. 275, 176 P 329, 330
( 1918), wherein the Colorado Court quoted from the
· opinion in United States vs. Lee, D.C. 170 F. 163, as
·
follows:
"The purpose of a recognizance is not to enrich the treasury, but to serve the convenience
of the party accused, but not convicted, without
interfering with or def eating the administration
of justice ... "
It is conceded that factually the matter herein is

distinguishable from the line of authority just announced. However, the principle is not distinguishable.
In both the Reed and Allison cases, the defendant was
held in the foreign jurisdiction beyond the time he was
to have appeared in the jurisdiction he was formerly
admitted to bail in. Appellant contends it should make
no difference that the defendant was held in the foreign
jurisdiction beyond the time he was required to appear,
as a result of a conviction, as opposed to being held
awaiting trial under a judicial declaration that he was
not to have bail.
In either situation the restraint and confinement
is permanent and beyond the power of influence by
the surety. The surety in the case at bar as well as the
cases cited as authority could not perform the condition
of the appearance bond because of the authority exercised by the foreign jurisdiction. He therefore should
be excused from the performance upon the rationale
and reasons set forth in the authority cited.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENY.
ING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET THE
FORFEITURE ASIDE AS THE BONDSMEN'S OBLIGATION JS ESSENTIALLY
CONTRACTUAL AND THE BONDSMEN
CAN RAISE THOSE DEFENSES ATTENDANT TO CONTRACT.
The appellant's obligation to the state is essentially contractual. Appellant contends that he is entitled to raise those defenses attendant to contract including excuse of his performance based upon impos.
sibility. There can be no doubt that appellant bound
himself by an absolute contract to perform an act in
the future which subsequently he could not perform
and which objectively could not be performed by anyone else.

The subsequent incarceration cannot reasonably
be supposed to have been within the contemplation of ·
the contracting parties when the contract was made.
The Bondsmen should be held to anticipate the principal's acts and not to an event beyond his control pro·
ducing effects not in hjs power to remedy. Appellant
cannot exercise any influence whatsoever upon the offi·
cials of Shelby County in Tennessee.
That a Bondsmen's obligation is contractual is
abundantly supported in the law. American Jurispru·
dence V 01.ume 50 on Suretyship Sections 1-3. The
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nature and definition of the relationship is defined as
follows by the American Law Institute's restatement
of the Law of Security Sectoin 82,
"Suretyship is the relation which exists where
one person has undertaken an obligation and
another person is also under an obligation or
other duty to the obligee, who is entitled to but
one performance, and as between the two who
are bound ,one rather than the other should perform."
It is the essence of the Surety's contract that he
will see that defendant appears. When the defendant
fails to appear, the Bondsmen's obligation is direct
and primary to the State.

This direct responsibility being contractual is not
absolute. "\Vithin the framework of recognized contract principals, the Bondsmen's contractual obligation
can be discharged or held in abeyance by the doctrine
of impossibility of performance.
Impossibility of performance is defined in the
American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of
Contracts in Section 454 as follows:
"Impossibility means not only strict impossibility but impracticability because of extreme
and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or
loss involved."
Comments in the notes following point out that
impossibility thus precludes or discharges a promisor's
duty.
•
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The American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law of Contract in Section 458 provides the theoretical
justification for appellant's contention in being relieved
from performance. It is there stated:
"A contractual duty or a duty to make compensation is discharged, in the absence of circumstances showing either a contrary intention
or contributing fault on the part of the person
subject to the duty, where performance is subsequently prevented or prohibited.

A....
B. By a judicial, executive, or administrafoe
order made with due authority by a Judge or
other officer of the United States, or of any one
of the United States."
The Bondsmen's payment of money is not regarded
as an alternative performance which he is still capable
of performing. Forfeiture as an alternative does not
produce indemnification. T,his States does not permit
a bail forfeiture in a felony. No alternative exists. The
one obligation of producing the defendant had been
rendered impossible of performance and as has been
suggested by section 458 (b) supra, the judicial order
of incarceration without bail in the foreign jurisdiction
discharged the bondsmen. (See defendant's Exhibit
#1).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized
the principle of supervening prevention by law result·
ing in a discharge of the promisor. In the case of Texas
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Company vs. Hogarth Shipping Company, LTD,
256 US 619, 415 CT 612, the Court in its opinion said:
"Here the ship was although still in existence
and entirely seaworthy, was rendered unavailable for the performance of the charter party by
the requisition. By that supervening act she was
impressed into the service of the British Government for a period extending beyond ... the
time for the charter voyage. In other words,
compliance with the charter party was made impossible by an act of the State."
'Vhen application is made of the foregoing principles, it is apparent as here that appellant should be
discharged from his performance. The unilateral act
of the State of Tennessee had made the Bondsmen's
performance impossible. The appellant by contractual
stipulation would have to assume the risk of the happening of the event before he could be bound.
Contractual defenses are available to this appellant.
\Vhen application of those principles are made, it is
apparent that appellant's obligation is discharged or
held in abeyance until the State of Tennessee makes
its disposition.

CONCLUSION
The appellants respectfully submit that the Order
of Forfeiture and Judgment should be set aside as
against the announced public policy asserted in the
cases cited by appellant. The relationship which existed
11

was essentially contract and as such the appellant~
should be permitted to raise those defenses attendant
to contract.
Respectfully submitted,
KARRAS, VAN SCIVER & YOCOj!
By Robert Yan Seiver
Attorney for Appellant-Bondsmen
661 East Fourth South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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